Contemporary Social Historical Perspectives on Mental Health Reform by Gostin, Lawrence O.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1983 
Contemporary Social Historical Perspectives on Mental Health 
Reform 
Lawrence O. Gostin 
Georgetown University Law Center, gostin@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/767 
 
10 J.L. & Soc'y 47-70 (1983) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Health Policy Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons 
JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIETY
VOLUME jO, NUMBER I, SUMMER 1983
Contemporary Social Historical Perspectives
on Mental Health Reform
LARRY GOSTIN*
Social historians have sometimes characterised the process of reform of
mental health legislation as a pendulum swinging between two opposing
schools of thought - legalism and professional discretion.[1] Neither term
is susceptible to neat definition. Traditional "legalism" appears to embody
a set of principles whereby the use of compulsory powers in mental health
should be carefully limited by clear criteria and legal procedures; often the
term is used to signify the importance of a judicial determination of the
need for compulsory admission. The Lunacy Laws, 1890-1930 contained
intricate legal regulation of admission to, and conditions in, hospital. This
legislation, devised in the social ostracism of the late Victorian era, was
seen in conventional social historical assessments as an obstacle to early
and effective treatment of mentally disordered people.f2] The Mental
Health Act 1959 was thought of as a negation of, and reaction to, legal
formalism. Its approach was effectively to make access to treatment and
care a matter for professional discretion. Review of medical decision-
making was limited to a small minority of cases; the system of review was
to be de facto and exercised by an administrative tribunal with a medical
component.[3]
The Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982 will be seen as a swing
towards legal formalism. Its main provisions are concerned, principally,
with furthering the legal safeguards available to patients, although it does
not go so far as to remove from professional discretion the initial decision
in respect of admission and treatment. This article is written from the
perspective of someone who has been identified as having sought to
influence the Parliamentary process on mental health reform toward a
"new legalism".[4] Since, on a conventional view, this is seen to be
following an historically discredited path, the article will examine some of
the main arguments against the legal approach; explain the legal strategy
which underlay the effort to reform the 1959 Act; and critically review the
main provisions of the 1982 Act.
THE MODERN FUNCTION OF LAW IN RELATION TO PSYCHIATRY
The tension between "legalism" and "professional discretion" is probably
the central cause of controversy at the interface of psychiatry and law.[5] In
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psychiatry, there is the perception that the legal profession is seeking to
substitute its discretion for that of the medical and social work professions.
It should be observed that there is little in the traditions, training or
experience of judges or members of the legal profession to commend them
in preference to mental health professionals who are traditionally associ-
ated with humanitarian values. Professor Kathleen Jones suggests that
legal intervention can only be remedial, not creative or inspiring: "The
need is not for increased legal formalism, but for human compassion and
professional skill ... Legal enactments have been tried repeatedly and
contributed little to genuine psychiatric progress". [6]
Professor Jones' argument is directed against a legal formalism that few
would support. Contemporary legal philosophy goes beyond the technical
formalism associated with the Lunacy Laws. It does not seek to erect a
cumbersome legal framework or to introduce technical legal procedures.
Thus, the argument that the "new legalism" is treading an historically
discredited path does not take account of contemporary legal thought,
although it is fair to react cautiously to any proposal which relies entirely
upon legal or judicial decision-making. It is also improper to suggest that
law and humanism are mutually exclusive - that there exists a sterile
choice between "legal enactments and restrictions" or "genuine psychiatric
advance", but not both.
Traditional legalism is founded upon the application of a body of law to
individual cases so that relatively consistent and fixed results accrue from
reasonably equivalent factual circumstances. Such attempts to promote
consistency and reasonable objectivity in psychiatric decision-making are,
in principle, sound. However, those who oppose legal intervention argue
that a formalistic or mechanistic approach is not suited to a field of human
endeavour which is, by its nature, individualistic and unpredictable; while
"remedial law" can lay down relatively fixed and simplistic rules to penalise
illegal activity, it cannot formulate a logical regulatory framework for
complex issues relating to human behaviour. It is true that the law has not
succeeded in trying to prescribe in detail the circumstances in which
compulsory psychiatric intervention is justified; there is perhaps no other
body of law which has undergone as many fundamental changes in
approach and philosophy as mental health law. Nevertheless, where
decisions involve the removal of a person's liberty or some other right of
self-determination, it is no answer to say that the law should not control
this activity because there are no reliable and consistent factors which
could govern such decisions. If this were the case, the remedy would not be
to leave medical discretion unfettered; rather, it would suggest that the
discretion should not be exercised at all, and certainly not under the
authority of law.
The most compelling argument against the traditional legal approach to
psychiatry is that it is essentially negative and reactive; the law reacts to
events and attempts to control them once they have occurred, but it cannot
shape or influence them in a positive way. The law can examine narrow
issues such as the occasional misuse of medical authority or the technical
unlawfulness of admission. It can even regulate in some detail the
provision of mental health services by setting boundaries and monitoring
professional practice. However, it cannot effectively examine and resolve
the more fundamental mental health issues relating to providing services
and meeting needs, particularly in community-based settings. Creative
ideas relating to the provision of services for people suffering from mental
distress seldom emanate from the legal profession. Moreover, the law
appears incapable of contributing to the development of effective services
as this requires long-term planning, budgeting, building, and management.
Clearly, these aspects of effective service provision are not within the
competency of the courts or the law. Nor do members of the legal
profession have the experience or expertise in areas of health and social
services to enable them to identify needs and to propose workable
solutions.
In sum, the legal approach to psychiatry has traditionally and perhaps
necessarily been narrow and predictable. It has become an almost routin-
ised and highly reactive counterbalance to medical and other professional
authority. It has therefore virtually lost any identity of its own, save as
being regulatory and critical of established psychiatric interests in a most
predictable way. [7]
The argument presented here is that a new role has been developing in
law which can and should be used as a strategy in the provision of services.
It would be quite wrong for the reasons given above to consider the law as
the exclusive or the most important element in the provision of medical
and social services. Yet a distinctive role can be identified. It will be further
argued that there is an important place for the law in setting limits on
established psychiatric measures relating, for example, to compulsory
admission and treatment, and even to particularly hazardous measures
taken with the consent of the patient. The final role of law is to ensure the
civil status of those who are the consumers of psychiatric services. One
must accept the fact that pernicious legal and social consequences some-
times are secondary features of the receipt of psychiatric services. Here the
law can make a distinctive contribution to uphold a person's personal
status and dignity. This approach does not pretend to offer a solution to the
more collective problems relating to deficiency in services, but the more
individualistic approach of the law has its own legitimacy in upholding the
integrity of people who have felt dehumanised by institutions, by the
opprobrium of society and by the discriminatory character of legislation.
THE IDEOLOGY OF ENTITLEMENT: THE CONTRIBUTION OF LAW TO THE PROVISION
OF ADEQUATE HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES
The premise of the ideology of entitlement is that access to health and
social services should not be based upon charitable or professional
discretion, but upon enforceable rights. The rules of equity and fairness are
deeply entrenched principles of law. From a broad legal perspective, a
government is not obliged to provide health and social services. However,
once it chooses to provide services, it cannot arbitrarily deprive or exclude
certain individuals or client groups. If there is an unreasonable denial of a
service, the remedy is, or should be, provided by the law.
The right to a service, of course, does not emanate from intangible
jurisprudential or moral philosophy, but from statute, administrative
regulation or common law. Great Britain, for example, provides a reason-
ably comprehensive health and social service. There is a wide ranging body
of legislation which provides a general cntitlement to treatment, care,
housing, social and legal services.[8] Thus, the provision of services is,
from its origin, integrally associated with law. Improvements in the nature
or quality of that service lie, at least in part, on enforcement of the law or
in its reform. This approach relies, in part, upon "open textured" or
"enabling" legislation which must be supported by adequate financing,
efficient management and good practice. Schedule 8(2) of the National
Health Service Act 1977, in conjunction with DHSS Ciruclar 19/74,
provides a general entitlement to community-based social services for
mentally disordered people.[91 The availability and adequacy of such
services are important because they can either prevent the need for
compulsory hospital care or can shorten its duration. This upholds the
principle of the "least restrictive alternative" - i.e. the use of compulsory
-powers must be the least invasive of individual liberty and autonomy as is
necessary for the achievement of valid public objectives. Thus, if equally
effective treatment and care can be achieved in a community setting and
without the use of compulsory powers, that alternative should be pursued
in preference to confinement in hospital. The principle of the least
restrictive alternative would require the Government to create a full range
of community services including housing, crisis intervention, medical and
nursing support, training and employment. It would require the social
worker to explore community alternatives before making an application
for admission to hospital, and to refuse to make an application where the
person could be supported at home or in a non-institutional setting.
One way to achieve the objective of community-based health and social
services is to place specific statutory duties on health and local authorities.
The ideology of entitlement, then, can seek to establish the right to a
service which can be enforced at the behest of a client group or an
individual. This draws the attention of the relevant public authorities to
their legal and social obligations to particularly under-privileged client
groups and draws public attention to under-provision and under-resourcing
in areas of concern. There is an expectation that this legal approach will be
resisted because public authorities and professionals wish to allocate scarce
resources at their discretion and not in accordance with the principle of
entitlement. The consumers of psychiatric services are not an organised
political force. The ideology of entitlement represents one method of
creating pressure for access to services, as well as a more equitable
distribution of services, to an extremely vulnerable group.
Important instances in the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982 of the
concept of "entitlement" to services involve after-care and crisis inter-
vention services - which are both community-based and emphasise the
avoidance of hospital care. A further example of service entitlement is in
the provision of publicly-funded legal representation for patients. Unsur-
prisingly, none of these reforms were in the Bill as originally published and
each was resisted by central and local Government during the Parliamen-
tary process.[ 101
After-Care Services
Section 51 of the Amendment Act lays a duty on the District Health
Authority and the local social services authority, in co-operation with
relevant voluntary agencies, to provide after-care services. The section
applies to persons, having been detained for treatment or under a hospital
order or transfer direction, who cease to be detained and leave hospital.
"After-care services" are not defined in the Act but the duty remains in
force until the District Health Authority and social services authority are
satisfied that the person no longer needs such services. The authority which
has the mandatory duty is the one in which the person concerned is
resident or to which he is sent upon discharge.
The Parliamentary debates relating to the amendment repeatedly em-
phasised the chronic under-provision of after-care facilities; the fact that
after-care would prevent prolonged institutionalisation of mentally dis-
ordered people in hospitals and prisons which would be both invasive of
individual liberty and uneconomic; and that a specific and unequivocal
mandatory responsibility placed in mental health legislation would encour-
age public authorities to make after-care for detained patients a pri-
ority.[11]
Baroness Masham of Ilton, who moved the amendment, said its purpose
was "to restate what should be in the statute. The present legislation
dealing with after-care for problem patients is unconsolidated and non-
obligatory."[121 Lord Redcliffe-Maud, during the Third Reading debate in
the House of Lords, where the amendment was first carried, made perhaps
the clearest enunciation of the principle of entitlement:
I know there is power in both the local authority and in the National Health Service to
see that what we all want to happen does happen, but .. with local authorities so cut
back and restricted in their ability to raise money for proposals more politically viable
than the health of the mentally defective and mentally ill, they are not going to do what
is wanted unless there is a very clear instruction from Parliament . . .[13]
The after-care amendment was discouraged by central Government and by
local authority representatives throughout its passage in Parliament.[14] Its
weaknesses are that it applies only to long-term compulsorily detained
patients; it is not sufficiently detailed in setting out what an adequate after-
care service would comprise; and it does not provide any clear methods of
enforcement. More importantly, the amendment was not thought to have
substantial revenue implications which indicates that, if it is to be imple-
mented at all, the funding must come from other areas of the health and
social services budget.
The Role of the Approved Social Worker
There are two general aspects of the decision to exercise compulsory
powers under mental health legislation. The first involves a medical
assessment: whether the person is suffering from mental disorder; whether
admission to hospital is necessary for his own health or safety or for the
protection of others; and whether the treatment will ameliorate the
person's condition. Prior to the Amendment Act, Parliament had not
provided any guidance as to the second aspect of the use of compulsion -
i.e. the social assessment. The Mental Health Act 1959 did not specify
minimum standards for the appointment of Mental Welfare Officers
(MWOs); the Act showed a preference for applications by relatives,
thereby circumventing the need for an expert social assessment; and there
were no clear criteria for the exercise of social work judgments.
The Amendment Act places three new responsibilities on local social
services authorities and MWOs. First, before making an application for
admission, an MWO must interview the patient and satisfy himself that
"detention in hospital ... is the most appropriate way of providing the
care and medical treatment of which the patient stands in need" (s.16(3)).
Second, a duty is placed on a local social services authority, if so required
by the nearest relative or a patient residing in their area, to direct an MWO
to consider whether an application ought to be made. If the MWO decides
not to make the application, he must inform the nearest relative of his
reasons in writing (s.16(3)). Third, where a patient is admitted under an
application for assessment or treatment made by his nearest relative, the
hospital managers must give notice of this fact to the local social services
authority for the area in which the patient resided, and that authority must
arrange for a social worker to interview the patient and provide the
managers with a report on his social circumstances (s. 17).
These three provisions, taken together, show a recognition of the
importance of a social assessment either prior to, or shortly following, the
exercise of compulsory powers. The social work role is to examine
community alternatives to compulsory admission to hospital. The social
worker should examine, not whether medical treatment in hospital is
warranted, but whether, in view of the alternative services and support that
could be provided in the community, admission is the most appropriate
way of providing that treatment.
The Amendment Act also reflects the recognition that MWOs require
appropriate training and experience. Accordingly, two years after the
passage of the Act (October 28, 1984) the functions conferred on MWOs
will be discharged by approved social workers. Approved social workers
must be appointed by the local social services authority as having appropri-
ate competence in dealing with persons who are suffering from mental
disorder (s.61).
Towards More Radical Reform
There were significant, albeit unsuccessful, attempts in the Parliamentary
debates preceding the 1982 Act to pass far reaching amendments entitling
mentally disordered people to have a legal entitlement to crisis inter-
vention and broad community-based services. The essence of crisis inter-
vention services is that, through the availability of a 24-hour multi-
disciplinary team, emergency mental health problems can often be re-
solved in the community without resorting to compulsory hospital ad-
mission.[15] The previous Government accepted this concept in its 1978
White Paper and suggested that an emergency application under section 29
of the 1959 Act "should allow a person's removal to a "place of assess-
ment" and that this should be defined to include any local authority social
services or health authority accommodation, as well as a hospital".[16] The
use of legislation to correct under-resourcing was a persistent theme of the
Opposition who also attempted to extend the Masham amendment to
apply to all persons suffering from mental disorder, as a measure of
prevention, care and after-care. [171
Future mental health legislation should extend the concept of a full
entitlement to a wide range of "less restrictive" and more effective
community-based services. There is also a case for moving towards a right
to treatment for in-patients. The rationale for a "right to treatment" is
particularly persuasive in the case of compulsorily detained patients.
Compulsory admission to hospital is justified, in large part, by the person's
need for treatment, together with his failure to comprehend the existence
of such a need. Equally important, confinement should cease when the
reasons for the use of compulsion no longer exist.
An "admission for treatment" necessarily implies that the purpose of
admission is treatment, and its goal is to restore the person to a position of
health and social stability where he can return to the community. The
confinement should continually be justified by progress towards the goal
set at the time of admission. The state could rationally justify continued
detention of a person only if adequate treatment were available. From the
perspective of the exercise of state authority, then, the duty to provide
treatment is the corollary of the right to exercise compulsory powers.
Legal Services
In addition to the theme of a legal entitlement to health and social services,
a persistent feature of the Parliamentary debates involved an ultimately
successful attempt to provide patients appearing before Mental Health
Review Tribunals with an entitlement to public funding for their legal
representation. The effectiveness of Mental Health Review Tribunals is
only to a limited extent dependent upon their procedures and powers. Far
more important is the availability and quality of representation. The effects
of institutionalisation, the patient's mental illness or handicap, his defer-
ence to medical authority and the effects of major tranquillisers, make self
advocacy invariably difficult and sometimes impossible. Further, the
unrepresented patient is frequently denied the full details of the case
against him, including medical and social enquiry reports, which provide
the rationale for detention.[18]
One of the central criticisms of the legal formalism of the old Lunacy
Laws was that the review by a magistrate presented formal procedural
barriers to access to care, but was not a reliable safeguard against medical
discretion exercised without sufficient cause or justification; magistrates'
review became a highly routinised confirmation of medical authority.[191
The new legalism does not seek formalistic (but essentially ineffective)
review procedures. Rather, it seeks to ensure a full and fair hearing of the
case relating to the use of compulsory powers without recourse to
unnecessary formality. A trained representative is needed to put the legal,
medical and social aspects of the case to the tribunal. The availability of
representation, moreover, should not be a matter which is dependent upon
the ability of the patient to pay. Mental Health Review Tribunals are the
-only tribunals where the outcome of the hearing affects a person's liberty.
It is very much a part of the legal approach in mental health to ensure that
there is public financing for representation to enable the patient to know
and critically examine the reasons for detention, to seek independent
professional advice and to explore community alternatives to hospital care.
The arguments in Parliament for the right to state-aided representation
were advanced primarily by lawyers who emphasised the importance of
effective legal controls on matters involving individual liberty.[20] Con-
currently, there was public pressure placed on the Government from the
Law Society and Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee to extend Assist-
ance by Way of Representation (ABWR) for representation before Mental
Health Review Tribunals.[211 MIND lodged an application, Collins v. the
United Kingdom, with the European Commission of Human Rights
alleging that Article 5(4) of the Convention required Contracting Parties to
grant public financing to their nationals for representation at mental health
hearings.[22] The Collins application is awaiting a decision of the Com-
mission. It should be observed, however, that the organs of the Conven-
tion have repeatedly emphasised the need for effective legal assistance as
part of the "special procedural guarantees" required in mental health
cases.[23] Further, in Airey v. Republic of Ireland, the Court considered
that the right of a person to appear in the High Court without represen-
tation would not be "effective in the sense of whether she was able to
present her case properly and satisfactorily". The Court concluded that
publicly funded representation was required so that her rights under the
Convention were not "theoretical or illusory", but "practical and effec-
tive ". [24]
The Government twice resisted amendments in the House of Lords to
extend ABWR to Mental Health Review Tribunals, but only by narrow
margins.[25] The House of Commons Committee Stage was preceded by
an unusual Special Standing Committee which invited the Lord Chan-
cellor's Department and others to give evidence. A memorandum on
behalf of the Lord Chancellor to the Special Standing Committee stated
that the "Government has now decided that ABWR should be made
available for representation before Mental Health Review Tribunals".[26]
The Lord Chancellor subsequently brought forward the necessary regu-
lations under section 2A(3) of the Legal Aid Act 1974.[27] Further, the
Lord Chancellor's memorandum acknowledged the criteria for ABWR
would be framed so that there would "rarely, if ever, be circumstances in
which this type of assistance would be refused to a patient".[28]
LIMITATIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY
The decision to delegate wide discretionary authority to the medical
profession under the 1959 Act was made at a time of general optimism
about the capacity of the medical profession to solve society's age-long
problem of disease and deviance. In particular, medicine was perceived as
making great advances in the search for the aetiology and treatment of
schizophrenia; this was the time of the discovery of the major tranquillisers
and it was to be the beginning of an era where patients were to leave
institutions to be cared for in the community. It was within this social
context that medicine was perceived as manifestly humane, whereas the
law was seen as subordinating the individual's welfare to the collective
good. [29]
When one looks at psychiatry in this historical context and acknowledges
its deep affinity with humanism, it is curious that today it is associated,
perhaps more than any other profession, with power and its abuse. The
science of psychiatry has not fulfilled the unrealistically high expectations
that prevailed in the late 1950s. There is still substantial disagreement
concerning the causes of mental illness and no clear understanding of why
many treatments are thought to have a therapeutic effect. The 1959 Act
was founded upon the benefit that was thought to accrue to the patient.
The assumption was that psychiatrists could reliably and validly diagnose
particular forms of mental disorder, that they have an ability to predict
future behaviour in cases where the layman could not and that treatments
with established benefits exist. Yet, the evidence to demonstrate the
scientific objectivity of psychiatry is today highly equivocal. [30]
There is a sense of contradiction in the way that contemporary psy-
chiatry presents itself. Psychiatry purports to be a specialism of medicine; it
strives toward objectivity and identifies with the natural sciences. The
psychiatric journals bristle with research to seek to establish the empirical
efficacy of somatic treatments. At the same time, psychiatry asks not to be
held to account for its views in an objective and scientific way. It asks,
rather, to operate under the ambiguous parameters of "clinical judgment",
which relies not upon an empiricist view but upon unspoken areas of
personal intuition and subjective judgments.
The objective of the legal approach is to ensure, particularly where
compulsion is involved, that the psychiatric experts, minimally, can explain
and justify their decision to the lay person and that there exists some
objective behavioural evidence. Psychiatric decisions have been based
upon "expert" opinion and, predictably, doctors have insisted upon their
expertise. In this way they have avoided a wider review of their decisions.
Mental health professionals, according to the legal approach, should be
required to state the grounds for their decisions in terms which are open to
examination by others. The confrontation should then be on the question
of the adequacy of the grounds advanced and not on the basis of presumed
expertise. This is the area of disagreement at the interface of law and
psychiatry. The legal approach does not accept unsupported claims of
knowledge in areas of diagnosis, behaviour prediction, or treatment. In
each context the law should require some observable evidence to support
professional judgments.
The Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982 did not remove from
psychiatrists, social workers and others the right to exercise professional
judgment, nor were clear legal boundaries (substantive criteria and pro-
cedures) set at each stage in the decision-making process. Undoubtedly,
however, the trend was toward more precise definitions and more frequent
opportunities for review of professional judgments relating to the classi-
fication of mental disorder, compulsory admission and treatment.
Classification of Mental Disorder
The Amendment Act reduced professional discretion to recommend the
compulsory admission of patients in several significant ways. The defin-
ition of mental disorder was unchanged, except that a person may not be
classified as mentally disordered by reason only of "promiscuity or other
immoral conduct, sexual deviancy or dependence on alcohol or drugs"
(s.2). More important, the sub-categories - severe subnormality and
subnormality - were replaced by the terms "severe mental impairment".
The definition of these sub-categories is essentially the same as under the
1959 Act, except that the person's arrested or incomplete development of
mind must now be associated with "abnormally aggressive or seriously
irresponsible behaviour" (s. 1). This limits the discretion of a medical
practitioner to recommend long-term compulsory admission by requiring
him to show some behavioural basis indicating aggression or serious
irresponsibility. Finally, the Act introduces a new "treatability" test for
long-term compulsory admission. It requires, in the case of psychopathic
disorder or mental impairment, that "treatment is likely to alleviate or
prevent a deterioration in his condition".
Guardianship
One of the most significant shifts in emphasis toward more limited
professional discretion is in the powers of the guardian. The Mental Health
Act 1959 granted to the guardian all powers that a father would have over a
child under the age of fourteen. These powers are not specified in
legislation, but are thought to be considerable, possibly imposing on the
ward significant civil disabilities which prevent, for example, marriage or
entering into a contract. Some local social services authorities considered
that the guardian must exercise "parental powers" in a broad sense and
must accept extensive responsibility for the behaviour and protection of
the patient. This has been one of the reasons for a sharp decrease in the
number of guardianship applications in the last decade. [311
The Amendment Act introduces an "essential" or "specific" powers
approach so that the guardian has power only to require residence in a
specified place, attendance for the purpose of medical treatment, occu-
pation, education or training, and access to the patient to be given to a
doctor or social worker (s.8). Notwithstanding these powers, reception
into guardianship does not require the patient to receive treatment without
consent (s.42(1)). Further, guardianship applications can no longer be
made in respect of children under the age of sixteen (s.7).
Guardianship is a term which should encompass two distinct concepts:
the incompetency of a person to make certain decisions, and the authority
delegated to another person to make decisions on behalf of the ward.[32]
Incompetency is seldom all inclusive; a mentally disordered person's ability
to understand and participate in his social and physical environment will
vary over time and under different situations. Guardianship legislation,
properly conceived, would limit a person's freedoms and autonomy only to
the extent that he is incapable of responsible action and decision-mak-
ing.[33] Further, legislation should impose positive duties on the guardian
to provide assistance and obtain services for the ward, instead of author-
ising him to exercise compulsory powers. The essential powers approach in
the Amendment Act represents a partial recognition of the need to limit
the exercise of compulsory powers, although there is significant scope for
more creaiive use of personal guardianship in future mental health
legislation.
Tribunal Review
Mental Health Review Tribunals are the institutional means by which a
patient can challenge the substantive justification for his detention. The
1959 Act severely limited the opportunities where a person could apply for
a tribunal; only patients admitted under the long-term provisions of the
Act are eligible to apply and generally only during the applicable periods of
detention. Further, some 85% of those eligible to apply do not exercise
their entitlement. [34]
The Amendment Act significantly increases the opportunities for tri-
bunal review. It does so by halving the periods of detention (s.12); by
providing for automatic referral for those who do not take the initiative to
apply (s.40); and by extending the right to apply to patients detained for
"assessment" (previously "observation") (s.3).
The Act gives restricted patients detained under sections 60/65 of the
1959 Act the right of access to a tribunal with the power to discharge (s.28
and sch. 1). This represents a fundamental change in philosophy by
removing from the Home Secretary the power to determine when, and
under what conditions, a patient, who was considered dangerous by the
sentencing court, should be discharged. This important reform was forced
upon the Government by the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in X v. the United Kingdom. The Court ruled that section 65 of the
1959 Act violated Article 5(4) of the Convention because restricted
patients were unable to have a binding periodic judicial determination of
the substantive justification for their detention.[35] The Court's judgment
was referred to frequently in the Parliamentary debates. [361
Consent to Treatment
*The legal position of the detained patient to refuse treatment under the
Mental Health Act 1959 was unclear, notwithstanding the commonly held
medico-legal assumption that involuntary admission was intimately associ-
ated with a patient's subsequent treatment.[371 The Amendment Act (Part
VI) clarifies the position of the detained patient. It is probably the only
statute in the recent history of the law of England and Wales which makes
comprehensive arrangements for the treatment of patients without con-
sent.
The Act creates a series of formal obstacles in cases where certain
treatments are to be administered to detained patients. The consent
provisions apply to any patient "liable to be detained", except those
admitted under short-term powers or remanded to hospital for report.
Several categories of treatment are dealt with differently. First, psycho-
surgery and other forms of treatment as may be specified by regulations or
a code of practice cannot be given unless the patient consents and a second
opinion is obtained. A medical practitioner and two other persons ap-
pointed by the Mental Health Act Commission must certify in writing that
the patient is competent and has consented. The medical practitioner,
moreover, must certify in writing that, having regard to the likelihood of
the treatment alleviating or preventing a deterioration of the patient's
condition, it should be given. Further, before giving a certificate, the
medical practitioner must consult with two other persons who have been
professionally concerned with the patient's treatment, one of whom is a
nurse and the other neither a nurse nor a doctor.
These arrangements represent one of the basic departures from tradi-
tional common law assumptions contained in the Act. Specific treatments
which give rise to special concern cannot be given even with the consent of
the patient, unless there is independent verification that the patient is
competent to give consent and that the treatment is effective. This
departure from the common lzw principle respecting a voluntary thera-
peutic relationship between doctor and patient is further undermined by
the fact that the provisions requiring consent and a second opinion apply to
patients not liable to be detained. This is an instance where departure from
traditional legal norms may be justified. This is because of the difficulties
of obtaining a voluntary and informed consent from psychiatric patients;
the potentially hazardous or irreversible nature of the treatment on
patients; and the need to control the psychiatric profession in its use of
treatments which may not be fully established. [38]
The second category of treatment applies to the administration of
medicine by any means and treatments to be specified in regulations; the
regulations are almost certain to include electro-convulsive therapy. These
treatments cannot be given unless the patient consents or a second opinion
is obtained. The consent must be confirmed by a certification in writing by
the responsible medical officer (RMO) or by a medical practitioner
appointed by the Mental Health Act Commission. The second opinion
must be given by a medical practitioner appointed by the Commission who
must certify in writing that the patient is not capable of giving consent or
has not consented but, having regard to the likelihood of it alleviating or
preventing a deterioration in his condition, the treatment should be given.
Before making a certificate the doctor must consult a nurse and another
professional (not being a doctor or a nurse) who is professionally con-
cerned with the patient's treatment.
The need for a second opinion does not arise in the case of "admini-
stration of drugs by any means" until three months after the drug was first
administered. However, the "three months rule" would not apply to
treatments listed in regulations or the code of practice.
The Act provides that all other forms of treatment for mental disorder
which are not included in the provisions outlined above may be given
without the need to obtain a consent or a second opinion. This could
conceivably include potentially intrusive forms of treatment such as
behaviour modification, physical restraint and seclusion. Much will depend
upon the adequacy of the regulations and code of practice which will be
prepared by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Mental Health
Act Commission.
The Amendment Act provides, for the first time in the history of the law
of England and Wales, specific authority to impose somatic treatment
upon a patient who understands the nature and purpose of the treatment,
but expressly withholds consent. It had previously been observed that:
• . . in psychiatry and law the entire edifice of forcible treatment is erected upon the
presumed incompetence of patients to consent to medical procedures. Any other
position would be arbitrary; if a patient has the capability reasonably to understand the
nature and purpose of treatment there is no more justification for disregarding his own
conception of his self interest than there is in the case of any other patient - whether
physically or psychiatrically disabled. [39]
The Amendment Act establishes intricately detailed regulation of consent,
treatment and second opinions. Consents or certificates under the Act may
relate to plans of treatment which may specify a number of different forms
of treatment. Where a certificate is given for a plan of treatment it provides
authority for the administration of all of the diverse forms of treatment
within the plan. The Act upholds the common law right to withdraw
consent, but only subject to broad emergency provisions. Urgent treat-
ment can be given without the need for consent or a second opinion. The
"urgent treatment" provisions are broadly based and include the right to
prevent "a serious deterioration in the patient's condition" or to "alleviate
serious suffering". There are exceptions for hazardous or irreversible
treatments which are defined tautologically in the Act.
The consent to treatment provisions, on their face, appear to be a
triumph of legalism; they are complex and require the doctor to proceed
through a number of procedural obstacles prior to the administration of
.certain treatments. If closely examined, however, the consent provisions
represent a return to legal formalism, but do not provide an effective
safeguard for the unconsenting patient, except in respect of treatments
requiring consent and a second opinion. The form of second opinion is
medical with a duty only to consult other professionals. Professional self-
regulation is always open to the criticism that it is not sufficiently open,
rigorous and dispassionate. The duty to consult other professionals was
very much a compromise measure arrived at by the House of Commons
Standing Committee. It represented, firstly, an attempt by the Committee
to legislate for good practice by requiring doctors to operate on a multi-
disciplinary basis; secondly, it was viewed as a greater safeguard for the
patient to invoke a more widely-based second opinion. The difficulty with
the compromise is not only that the role of non-medical professionals is
part of a consultation - not a decision-making - process, but also that
those professionals are not independent. As part of the therapeutic team at
the hospital who originally devised the treatment, they will not be in a
position to effectively question their own treatment programme.
In summary, the Amendment Act seeks to protect the rights of patients
through the use of formal certifications and detailed procedure reminiscent
of the Lunacy Laws. It will not satisfy mental health professionals because
of its heavily legalistic quality, emphasising form rather than substance,
and requiring the detailed observance of technical legal standards and
recordings. At the same time it will not provide patients with a meaningful
safeguard, firstly, because of the number and extent of exceptions to the
principle of self-determination and, secondly, because there will be insuffi-
cient confidence in a system which relies essentially upon peer review.
The Mental Health Act Commission
Since the abolition of the Board of Control in 1959 there has been no body
with specific responsibility to examine the use of compulsory powers under
mental health legislation.[401 The Secretary of State, however, is now to
establish under section 11 of the National Health Service Act 1977 a special
health authority to be known as the Mental Health Act Commission (The
1982 Act, s.56). The MHAC will have a general protective function over
detained patients. It will have the specific functions of visiting and
interviewing patients, having complaints investigated, and appointing
medical practitioners and other professionals for giving second opinions
under the consent to treatment provisions.
The Commission is potentially important for holding professionals
accountable for their decisions. There will, however, be limitations on its
effectiveness: it has few statutory powers, for example, to discharge a
patient or to enforce its recommendations following the investigation of a
complaint; it has only 70 part-time members with the duty to visit and
interview detained patients in more than 300 hospitals; it has at present no
jurisdiction over informal patients; and it has no power to examine the
general conditions or quality of services provided in hospitals.
MAINTAINING THE CIVIL AND SOCIAL STATUS OF PATIENTS
The final legal approach to contemporary mental health problems is to
maintain the civil and social status of those designated as mentally ill or
handicapped. Paradoxically, broadly based discrimination is, in part, an
inheritance of the Lunacy Laws and other legislation devised in the
Victorian era. Such legislation, when examined carefully, is devoted, not
to provision of services, but primarily to the withdrawal of certain rights or
privileges which are afforded to others in society. Basic societal rights or
privileges such as enfranchisement, correspondence, jury service, access to
the courts, control of one's own possessions and finance, licences to drive
or engage in a profession, and immigration, can often be withdrawn
without posing the question - is the individual capable of exercising the
right or privilege at issue? The contemporary legal principle is that
legislation should not place extra jurisprudential, social or political bur-
dens on those designated as mentally disordered unless these are justified
by substantial and reasonable societal objectives.
There follows an examination of two selected reforms in the Amend-
ment Act where Parliament implicitly questioned traditional paternalistic
attitudes toward mental disorder and deviance. The right of access to the
courts and enfranchisement have been chosen as illustrations because of
their importance in establishing the civil and social status of any insular
minority in society.
Access to the Courts
Section 141 of the Mental Health Act 1959 placed a significant impediment
on any person seeking to bring civil or criminal proceedings against any
person carrying out functions in pursuance of the Act. It required the
person to obtain leave of the High Court before bringing such proceedings,
and leave could not be granted unless there were substantial grounds to
show that the person to be proceeded against acted in-bad faith or without
reasonable care. In many important cases, such as wrongful imprisonment,
the Act did not simply impede, but effectively prevented a psychiatric
patient from obtaining legal redress because bad faith or lack of reasonable
care were not part of the cause of action. In Kynaston's case,[41] for
example, a psychiatric patient was placed in the invidious position of not
being permitted even to present a claim to the domestic courts that he was
a sane person detained in a maximum security hospital without lawful
justification.
The origins of section 141 give an indication of the social and jurispru-
dential assumptions upon which it is based. In evidence to the Dillwyn
Committee Mr. Maudsley, M.D., expressed the concern that "some years
ago there was an action brought against a medical man for illegally signing
an order for detention for a patient ... It appears to me there should be
some relief to medical men".[42] Similarly, the Royal Commission on
Lunacy and Mental Disorder spoke of a "certification strike" by medical
practitioners because of their alleged vulnerability to legal actions by
patients. [431 Thus, the historical origin of the withdrawal of a basic right to
those designated as mentally ill arose, not because of any evidence that
they were incapable of reasonably exercising the right, but because of the
perceived need to protect the medical profession.
The earliest precursor to section 141 of the 1959 Act was section 12 of
the Lunacy Amendment Act 1889. The terms of section 12 were re-enacted
in section 33 of the Lunacy Act 1890 and section 62 of the Mental
Deficiency Act 1913. A similar impediment to judicial process was carried
over into the Mental Treatment Act 1930. However, throughout this
period the way the provision was construed changed almost imperceptibly,
until now it has resulted in a rigid judicial attitude toward people suffering
from mental distress. In Pountney's case[441 an actual conviction of a nurse
for assaulting a patient was overturned on the basis that the patient had no
unqualified right to sue. Lord Simon stated that psychiatric patients are
"inherently likely to harass those concerned with them by groundless
charges and litigation".
The concept that all, or even a substantial majority, of patients in
psychiatric hospitals would be likely to bring unwarranted litigation unless
barred by section 141, contains an antiquated and unsupported notion of
how patients are likely to behave. The range of behaviour of people
designated as mentally disordered is just as diverse as for any section of the
population. The vast majority of people (some, for example, with de-
pression or mental handicap) are admitted to hospital under a set of
circumstances which do not justify infringement of their rights. Mere entry
into hospital does not justify the conclusion that the patient would be more
likely than the population at large to bring vexatious or unnecessary
litigation. Indeed an examination of the number of actions brought by
psychiatric patients indicates the opposite conclusion - i.e. that the
majority of patients are too withdrawn, isolated and unsure to pursue even
their genuine legal interests.[45] The Amendment Act reversed the legis-
lative and judicial trend of increasing the scope of section 141. At the time
the Act was debated in Parliament Kynaston's case (and the related case of
Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom) were being considered by the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights.[46] The European cases illustrated
that, far from the original intention, section 141 was effectively protecting
public authorities (not doctors or other professional staff) from litigation
brought by patients. The European cases featured extensively in the
Parliamentary debates in the House of Lords.[47] Indeed a former
Conservative Minister of State involved in the passage of the 1959 Act
urged the Government to submit to pressure from Strasbourg:
It looks as though both of these cases will be as successful as other recent cases brought
to the European Court of Human Rights about other aspects of our law relating to
mental health . We do not want this kind of proceeding to go on indefinitely - we
come out of it badly every time - and it is so obvious on this occasion that we could
save ourselves trouble and, indeed, some degree of ignominy.[48]
The Government, despite strong opposition in the House of Lords, did not
agree to amendments of section 141. This resulted in considerable private
activity from members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on
the Bill and from concerned voluntary bodies. As a result the Government
agreed, without recourse to any further Parliamentary debate, to an
amendment put forward in Committee which was clearly designed to
rectify the injustices apparent in the Strasbourg cases.[49] The Act
removes from the scope of section 141 proceedings against the Secretary of
State or a health authority; criminal proceedings are now to be brought
with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, instead of by leave
of the High Court; and the requirement of showing "substantial grounds"
for the claim is to be removed (s.60).
Enfranchisement
In order to vote in the United Kingdom the person's name must appear on
the register of electors as a resident of a particular locality. Any place
where the elector legitimately resides may be used as an address which
qualifies the person for entry onto the register. The single exception is
found in section 4(3) of the Representation of the People Act 1949 which
prevents any "patient" who resides in a hospital maintained for the
treatment of mental disorder from using that address for electoral pur-
poses.
The fundamental objection to section 4(3) is that it deprives a citizen of
the right to vote, not on the basis of individual fitness, but solely on a
residential criterion. An informal patient who has a home address can be
registered and can either visit a polling station or be treated as an absentee
voter. Equally capable patients from the same hospital will be deprived of
the vote simply because they have no alternative address. Closer scrutiny
of section 4(3) reveals further anomalies. Homeless patients in general or
geriatric hospitals are entitled to use the hospital as their place of residence
for voting purposes. Accordingly, a patient in a psychiatric unit of a district
general hospital is entitled to vote whereas a resident in a psychiatric
hospital, possibly with the same psychiatric classification, is not. In effect,
the system disenfranchises people who are homeless and who reside in
mental illness or mental handicap hospitals, irrespective of their common
law capacity to vote. [501
Two county court cases brought by MIND established the right to vote
for residents of mental illness and mental handicap hospitals who could not
be regarded as patients within the meaning of section 147 of the 1959
Act.[51] In effect, this would apply only to those who are not considered
mentally disordered; since the definition of mental disorder under section 4
of the 1959 Act is so expansive, the county court cases theoretically should
enfranchise few residents. Nevertheless, the Government issued circulars
following the two county court decisions which probably increased their
impact. [52]
The Parliamentary debates placed great emphasis on the anomalies in
the law.[531 The objective of the House of Commons Standing Com-
mittee - to uphold the legal and social status of patients - was illustrated
by Christopher Price, MP:
The Committee agreed that one purpose of the Bill was to give a greater sense of
dignity to patients in mental hospitals. That has been our aim throughout. We did not
want to erode their rights, personality or dignity unless we had to. Yet there is no
better way to erode a citizen's dignity more closely than by telling him that he is
disenfranchised, especially when he is perfectly capable of understanding what voting
is all about.[54]
The Standing Committee voted by a majority of one to repeal the
relevant provisions of section 4(3).[55] The Government came under
considerable pressure to reverse the Committee's amendment by Members
of Parliament who held marginal constituencies and where there was a
sizeable patient population. There was an assumption that enfranchising
patients would have a "swamping" effect and would distort election
results.[561 The assumption, however, was unfounded; an American study
showed that patients voted in patterns which accorded exactly with the
population at large, including the number of spoilt votes. [57]
The Amendment Act (s.62(2) and sched. 2). contains a compromise
which allows a "voluntary mental patient" residing in "mental hospital" on
the qualifying date to make an annual declaration which enables him to be
registered as an elector in respect of an address outside of the hospital.
Such a patient can register to vote at an address where he would be
resident if he were not in hospital - e.g. a home or hospital to where he
expects to be discharged - or any address (other than a mental hospital)
at which he was residing in the United Kingdom. (This need not be the last
such address). The declaration must be made without assistance (except
assistance necessitated by blindness or other incapacity) and must be
attested, in the prescribed manner by a member of the hospital staff. [58]
The result, then, is to allow most informal patients to vote, but not to
influence the election result in the constituency where the hospital is
situated. For long-stay patients the hospital is their home. Enabling such
patients to exercise the franchise in another, perhaps distant, constituency
means that Members of Parliament and Councillors will not be in a
position to concern themselves with the welfare or problems of the
constituent, or the adequacy of his surroundings. The elected official to
whom the elector should relate is the one representing the locality where
the elector lives, and where the services he depends upon are provided.
The advantage of allowing substantial numbers of voluntary patients to be
included on the electoral register in some local Government wards or
Parliamentary constituencies is that it might lead to elected officials
becoming more interested and responsive to the interests of those patients.
The new arrangements continue to be anomalous in that they do not
allow patients to use mental illness or mental handicap hospitals as a place
of residence for voting purposes, but allow patients in other hospitals and
nursing homes to do so. Informal patients have had to live in hospital
rather than the community, not because their condition requires in-
hospital treatment, but because successive Governments have failed to
provide sufficient alternative accommodation and support outside the
institution. Department of Health and Social Security figures have con-
sistently shown that between one and two thirds of patients enter mental
illness and mental handicap hospitals primarily for domiciliary and social
reasons.[59] The institution, therefore, has a distinct "hotel" or "asylum"
function, providing accommodation for people with no home. The failure
to meet publicly stated targets of community-based care should not be
compounded by a diminution in the electoral influence of the most
disadvantaged and isolated patients who have few other ways of being
heard.
The Amendment Act was "drafted to ensure that no voluntary patient
loses his vote because he cannot give an address".[60] Nevertheless, for a
small number of long-stay patients, there may be no former home in
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existence or which has been accurately recorded on hospital records; such
patients also may not be in a position to know where they would reside if
discharged.
The provision that the declaration must be completed without assistance
represents an implicit capacity test which was intended to replace the
general tests if incapacity under common law.[61] However, because the
statute is framed as part of the procedures for registration and not as a
substantive test of capacity, it is unclear whether a court would construe
them as supplanting such common law disabilities or as an addition to
them. The requirement of completing a declaration unassisted and with
attestation places psychiatric patients at a disadvantage. There is no
proscription on other electors obtaining assistance. Assistance to complete
postal forms, for example, is provided to elderly or infirm people in the
community, nursing homes and general hospitals and to patients on
psychiatric wards of district general hospitals. Further, there is no pro-
vision in electoral law for a declaration to be attested by another person. It
appears inequitable for a capacity test to pertain to a voluntary mental
patient but not to any other elector who may need assistance. It is likely
that a patient who has lived in hospital for many years will need assistance
in completing an electoral registration form. For a patient who has been
institutionalised over a long period of time, and who will not have had
experience with electoral registration, it is unreasonable to expect him to
complete a form without discussion with hospital staff or relatives.
Thomas Szasz observed of the amendment to enfranchise patients that it
simply legitimises psychiatric paternalism: " ".giving" mental patients the
vote is like "giving" slaves the vote - an Orwellian tragedy of words and
deeds".[62] From the perspective of an entitlement philosophy the
amendment confers a "right" which is symbolic of an improved social
status of patients. The "right", however, has been diluted so that it does
not further, even indirectly, a substantial interest of the patient such as
liberty or the receipt of services.
Summary and Conclusion
The "ideology of entitlement" appears to be an ill-conceived philosophy
upon which to promote the interests of any socially impoverished group of
people. There is a traditional affinity of law and lawyers to more estab-
lished interests in society and with public protection. There can be few
underprivileged people who feel comfortable with the law and who are
aware of its use to promote their interests and to meet their social needs.
The law is often perceived as concerned more with punishment, together
with formal procedural protection against unjustified punishment, than
with therapeutic ideals or the protection of morally justified values.
It is important to remain vigilant to any attempt by the legal profession
to erect a superstructure of technical procedures or cumbersome legal
regulations; nor should the discretion of lawyers and courts be substituted
for that of mental health professionals on matters of treatment. The
modern function of law suggested here does not usurp the function of
caring professions. It seeks to alter social perceptions of the mental health
services, which should place an emphasis on the person distressed and not
on the concerns of society or the profession. Once this principle is accepted
it follows that services should be provided as of right, according to the
needs of the person and not at the discretion of the professional; a person's
consent should be the operative factor and not what others feel would be in
the individual's best interests; and the receipt of services should be for the
benefit of the person and not to provide an automatic rationale for society
to diminish the civil and social status of the individual.
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